The Spatial Forms and Social Norms of ‘Actually Existing Neoliberalism’:
Toward a Substantive Analytics

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, critical geographers have turned analytical and empirical attention to the diverse forms of what Brenner and Theodor (2002) call “actually existing neoliberalism.” The present article contributes to this discussion by proposing a technical approach to neoliberalism, which is first developed conceptually, and then applied to the case of Post-Soviet fiscal reform in the Russian Federation. A key strength of this approach is that it clarifies the relationship between, on the one hand, the specific technical mechanisms that distinguish neoliberal proposals and, on the other, the broader political projects and trajectories of structural transformation into which such mechanisms might be assimilated. Neoliberal technical mechanisms, it is found, are deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms, and stand in diverse relationships to existing space-making mechanisms. Thus, in the Russian case neoliberal reforms do not serve only to undermine nationally articulated spatial mechanisms and solidaristic social norms. Rather, specific programs and proposals also function to rearticulate the spatial forms and social norms of Soviet socialism.

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In recent years, critical geographers have observed that the transformations associated with neoliberal reform do not conform to a simple model of liberalization and marketization with predictable implications for spatial transformation. Rather, what Brenner and Theodor call “actually existing neoliberalism” is shaped by “national, regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies of inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices, and political struggles” (Brenner and Theodore, 2002). Research into actually existing neoliberalism has provided, as Larner puts it, a growing understanding of “the different variants of neoliberalism…the hybrid nature of contemporary policies and programmes, [and] the multiple and contradictory aspects of neoliberal spaces, techniques, and subjects” (Larner, 2003: 309).

The present article contributes to this discussion by examining the diverse forms of actually existing neoliberalism through the lens of a technical analysis, which is first developed conceptually, and then applied to the case of Post-Soviet fiscal reform in the Russian Federation. “Technical” is meant in a Weberian sense: relating to questions of the means employed to achieve certain ends (Weber, 1978). The shared technical feature of neoliberal approaches is their use of market type mechanisms, such as quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand, in efforts to administer or govern.

The technical approach to neoliberalism discussed in what follows is distinct from, but complementary with, understandings of neoliberalism developed by critical
geographers. The critical geographic literature has generally analyzed neoliberal
techniques as they are related to either a hegemonic project or a fixed policy orientation
to liberalization and marketization. A technical analysis of neoliberalism, by contrast,
draws a clear distinction between, on the one hand, the specific technical mechanisms
that distinguish neoliberal proposals and, on the other, the broader political projects and
trajectories of structural transformation into which such mechanisms might be
assimilated.

The strength of such an approach is that it offers a perspective on the shifting
relations between these structural, political, and technical dimensions of neoliberalism
that has been absent in much critical geography. It also offers distinct insights into the
forms of actually existing neoliberalism. A technical analysis shows that the relationship
between these dimensions is much more polymorphous and unstable than is assumed in
much critical geographic work. Neoliberal technical mechanisms, it is found, are
deployed in relation to diverse political projects and social norms, and stand in
heterogeneous relationships to existing space-making mechanisms.

The analysis that follows addresses these issues in relationship to a problem that
has motivated and conceptually oriented much critical geographic work on neoliberalism:
namely, the analysis of post-Fordist structural and spatial transformation. Geographers
have powerfully deployed the tools of the regulation school to develop an analysis of
what Jessop (2001) calls the “spatio-temporal fix” of Fordist regulation. This spatio-
temporal fix emphasized organization on the national scale through wage, welfare, trade,
and industrial policy that sought to limit uneven development within the territory of the
nation-state. These policies served the norms of a solidarist social welfare project, and
promoted distinctive spatial patterns of industrial and urban agglomeration. To the extent that neoliberalism is associated with the weakening of key mechanisms of Fordist-Keynesian regulation, geographers have observed, it also may be expected to disrupt these spatial orders.

This regulationist problematic frames a number of important questions: To what extent are Fordist/Keynesian institutions actually weakened by specific neoliberal initiatives? Do reforms in some areas (industrial and financial reform, for instance) have a different relationship to Fordist/Keynesian institutions than reforms in other areas (social welfare policies, for example)? What are the spatial implications of these differences? And how do these patterns vary across cases and over time, as reform modalities evolve?

The first half of this article draws on two conceptual resources to address these questions: first, an approach to neoliberalism drawn from Michel Foucault’s sparse but rich observations on liberalism and neoliberalism; second, a neo-Polanyian substantive analytics, classically developed in economic anthropology. Scholars working from the former perspective have argued that neoliberalism should be understood not as marketization per se but, rather, as a form of practical reason or a political rationality that governs through market-type mechanisms of calculative choice or formal rationalization. However, following a long tradition of work in economic anthropology, it is argued that an analysis of these formal characteristics of neoliberalism must be combined with a substantive analysis of actually existing neoliberalism. Such a substantive analysis makes it possible to understand how mechanisms of calculative choice are articulated in specific domains. Three dimensions of such a substantive analytics are proposed: (1) the
institutionalization of calculative choice; (2) techno-economic regulation; and (3) the value orientations or substantive goals of neoliberal reforms.

The second half of the article applies this substantive analytics to budgetary reform in post-Soviet Russia. Both the Russian case and budgetary reform are exemplary for the core conceptual questions raised in this discussion. The Russian case presents a dramatic example of the upheaval of marketization loosed on an urban system shaped through inflexible forms of national (in this case, all-Union) spatial regulation. Budgetary reform, meanwhile, is one locus classicus of neoliberal reform proposals, and an area in which neoliberal reform has been both prevalent and contentious in recent decades.

A technical analysis of budgetary reform in Russia shows that neoliberal reform, at least in this specific domain, has a highly ambiguous relationship to solidarist social norms and nationally articulated spatial forms. Neoliberal budgetary reform does not only advance projects of marketization and liberalization that undermine the spatial systems of Soviet socialism. Rather, specific programs and proposals also function to re-embed the values, and rearticulate the spatial forms and social norms of Soviet socialism. The implication to be drawn from this case is not that the Russian case is a unique hybrid. Rather, it is that in every case where they are deployed, neoliberal mechanisms or modalities of reform partially re-inscribe or rearticulate the space-making mechanisms of Fordism. A technical analysis provides initial tools for observing how this process is structured in reforms themselves, and for posing empirical questions about how it unfolds.
I. Geographic Approaches to Actually Existing Neoliberalism

Critical geographers and other spatially minded social scientists have worked with a roughly common understanding of liberalism and neoliberalism [1]. As Brenner and Theodor (2002: 350) have written, “The linchpin of neoliberal ideology is the belief that open, competitive, and unregulated markets, liberated from all forms of state interference, represent the optimal mechanism for economic development.” But critical geographers have been quick to point out that liberalism and neoliberalism are rarely, if ever, actualized in pure form (Jessop, 2002). Rather, we see multiple “hybrid” forms that take shape as neoliberalism is articulated in specific domains. Geographers have examined two kinds of hybridization: the diverse spatial patterns associated with neoliberal transformation and the diverse forms of neoliberal proposals themselves.

Studies of the first type of hybridization – of the actual spatial transformations associated with neoliberalism – have often proceeded from a regulationist problematic of the type sketched out above. The institutions of Fordist/Keynesian regulation (and their functional equivalents outside the core of North Atlantic capitalism, such as the Soviet institutions discussed below) created distinctive spatial patterns, whose dominant organizational scale was national. To the extent that neoliberalism undermines these institutions it may be expected to undermine spatial forms with which they were associated and to create new scales of organization on supra-, sub-, and trans-national scales (cf. Storper 1995). Thus, Brenner and Theodor (2002: 363) have argued that “geographies of actually existing neoliberalism are characterized by [an] increasingly ‘glocalized’ configuration of global-national-local interactions in which no single scale serves as the primary pivot for accumulation, regulation, or sociopolitical struggle.”
Geographers have examined not only processes of spatial dispersion associated with markets but also “spatial dependencies” that have reproduced existing patterns of settlement and of economic agglomeration – or created new patterns – in the face of liberalization and marketization. (cf. Storper, 1995; Cox and Mair, 1988).

A second body of literature has added to this focus on the diverse spatial forms associated with neoliberalism an emphasis on a second type of hybridization, related to the changing content of neoliberal reforms themselves. Work in this vein has recognized that neoliberal mechanisms can be identified in an expanding range of policy types and political contexts. A particularly helpful account of this expansion of policy modalities has been articulated by Peck and Tickell, who distinguish three stages through which neoliberalism has passed in the U.K. and the U.S. The first stage—“proto-neoliberalism”—is primarily an intellectual development, involving “the restoration of a form of free-market thinking within the economics profession” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 388). The second stage – “rollback” neoliberalism – is associated with the state retrenchment promoted by Thatcher and Reagan. In the rollback stage, “state power was mobilized behind marketization and deregulation projects, aimed particularly at the central institutions of the Keynesian-welfarist settlement” (ibid.: 388).

In the third stage—which Peck and Tickell refer to as the stage of “rollout” neoliberalism—involves efforts to confront “the perverse economic consequences and pronounced social externalities of narrowly market-centric forms of neoliberalism” (ibid.: 388). Rollout neoliberalism, thus, addresses the contradictions and tensions produced by rollback neoliberalism through a “deliberate stretching of the neoliberal policy repertoire…to embrace a range of extra-market forms of governance and regulation”
The policies Peck and Tickell associate with rollout neoliberalism – such as ameliorative social policies, disciplinary penal policies, and workfare policies – diverge from what Brenner and Theodor identify as neoliberalism’s core ideological commitment to “open, competitive, and unregulated markets.” But, in Peck and Tickell’s understanding, such policies are still “neoliberal” to the extent that they are undertaken “in the service of neoliberal goals” and have been “licensed within the (broadly defined) neoliberal project” (ibid.:388).

The critical geographic literature has framed a rich agenda for research and conceptual elaboration. First, it has developed tools for an empirical analysis of the diverse spatial effects of neoliberal policies. Second, it has highlighted the crucial task of developing analytics for understanding the mutations of neoliberalism. Peck and Tickell’s approach is particularly notable for its identification and conceptualization of a shift in the content of neoliberal reforms and its typology of successive forms of neoliberalism. Although this framework is based on observations from the U.K. and the U.S., it is suggestive for developments outside the rich countries of the capitalist core. Similar patterns of reform, reaction, accommodation, and mutation of neoliberal policy proposals can be identified in a range of cases, including the Russian case, discussed below.

Critical geographic approaches in general, and Peck and Tickell’s argument in particular, also provoke a range of questions that have not been addressed directly in the literature. First, Peck and Tickell challenge scholars to reflect further on the spatial forms specific to rollout neoliberalism. Changes in neoliberalism’s policy repertoire may substantially alter the spatial implications of neoliberal reforms, and may, therefore, require us to re-conceptualize the relationship between neoliberalism and Fordist-
Keynesian modes of spatial regulation. Second, as Larner (2000) has observed, much critical geographic work retains a basic teleological assumption that “hybridization” of neoliberalism takes place within a broader hegemonic framework. At some moments, this link is explicitly justified. At others, however, there seems to be a conceptual slippage between an analysis of the specific technical mechanisms associated with “neoliberal” approaches and the broader social norms and goals of any political project. A crucial conceptual challenge, then, is to distinguish more clearly between the technical mechanisms associated with neoliberal reform and a broader political project. Such an analysis will at least make it possible to raise the question of whether the “the (broadly defined) neoliberal project” (Peck and Tickell, 2002: 388) is less stable and more polymorphous than some critical geographers suggest.

II. Neoliberalism: A Technical Analysis

The present section addresses these questions by developing a more precise conceptualization of the technical mechanisms of neoliberal reforms, and by distinguishing these from the diverse spatial forms and social norms with which they come to be associated. Its approach is indebted to a literature that has examined neoliberalism as a form of “governmentality”, or political rationality, which has drawn on Foucault’s observations on liberalism and neoliberalism. It is helpful to refer briefly to these observations, since they overlap in important ways with concerns that motivated Peck and Tickell’s analysis.

Foucault was interested specifically in the “polymorphism” of neoliberal forms and modes of thought, and with their “recurrence” in diverse contexts and circumstances (Foucault, 1997: 75). Thus, like Peck and Tickell, Foucault was concerned with the
heterogeneity of neoliberal proposals for reform. Moreover, he sought to understand how neoliberalism spread market forms to a range of domains that were not strictly economic. The domains he examined overlap with those Peck and Tickell identify as central to rollout neoliberalism, including welfare and penal policy.

These common points of departure noted, Foucault’s basic understanding of neoliberalism diverges from that articulated by critical geographers. Foucault saw neoliberalism as neither a fixed package of policies nor a hegemonic project. Rather, he saw liberalism and neoliberalism as forms of critical reflection on governmental practice, and also as attempts to “reform and rationalize” (*ibid.*: 77) this practice. This understanding differs, though in subtle ways, from a view of liberalism or neoliberalism as categorical rejections of government. Liberalism, Foucault argued, involved a *suspicion* of government: it is a critique of government that asks whether one must govern at all, and is alert to potential malign effects of government (*ibid.*:74-75). But as a political rationality, liberalism also implies a certain mode of governmental intervention. Thus, the characteristic feature of neoliberal government is not, in Foucault’s view, based on a doctrinaire attachment to a specific set of policies. Rather, neoliberalism is based on a flexible mode of critique and intervention that could assume a variety of concrete forms.

Foucault’s approach is perhaps best illustrated in his remarks on the relationship of liberalism and neoliberalism to the market. Foucault recognized the centrality of the market to both liberal and neoliberal thought. But he did not associate either with a strict adherence to the market as, in Polanyi’s term, the “natural law of society” (Polanyi, 1957). Rather, Foucault argued that for liberalism the market offered “a ‘test,’ a locus of
privileged experience where one can identify the effects of excessive governmentality and even weigh their significance” (1997: 76). Another way to put the point might be that the market, for neoliberalism, functions as an ideal regulating concept—in Weberian terms, an ideal type. It is a model against which the excesses and failures of governmental intervention (concerning information, allocative efficiency, and so on) might be measured, and in terms of which critical reflection on governmental activity might take place [2].

*Formal rationalization and substantive analysis*

The preceding discussion takes us part way to a technical definition of neoliberalism by identifying neoliberalism as a critique of governmental reason. It remains to positively define of the forms of governing and modes of intervention we refer to as “neoliberal.” Foucault offered only sketchy suggestions in his characterization of a specifically American variant of neoliberalism that sought to “extend the rationality of the market, the schemes of analysis it proposes, and the decision-making criteria it suggests, to areas that are not exclusively or not primarily economic” (*ibid.*: 79).

Neoliberalism, in this view, is associated with the extension of market *type* mechanisms – such as quantitative calculation, free choice, and price driven by supply and demand – into non-economic domains.

Building on these observations, the Foucaultian literature has defined neoliberalism as a political rationality that governs through the calculative choices of free actors (Burchell, 1996). This definition makes it clear that we find “neoliberal” mechanisms of calculative choice in a broad range of reforms and administrative
arrangements that otherwise seem heterogeneous: voucher schemes in education reform, pollution trading schemes, marketization of specific industries, and energy deregulation or reform. What links such diverse programs is not a common set of social norms, or a common underlying political project, but a common set of technical mechanisms.

In drawing attention to the common “neoliberal” technical elements of reforms and policy proposals in diverse domains, the technical approach offers distinctive insights into the polymorphism of neoliberal reforms. Critical geographers have understood the forms of actually existing neoliberalism in one of two ways: first, as the product of political resistances, spatial dependencies, or other path dependencies that shape specific policies; second, as the product of strategic adaptations and accommodations that serve a broader neoliberal hegemonic project. In both cases, critical geographers have tended to emphasize what might be called the external factors that reshape neoliberal initiatives in specific contexts.

A technical analysis, in contrast, draws attention to the internal technical process through which neoliberal programs take shape in specific substantive contexts. Calculative choice is *formal* in a sense that economic sociology and economic anthropology have specified over many years. As Polanyi explains, “[s]temming from the means-ends relationship, [calculative choice] is a universal whose referents are not restricted to any one field of human interest. Logical or mathematical terms of this sort are called formal in contrast to the specific areas to which they are applied” (1977: 20). It is precisely the formal character of calculative choice that allows us to identify neoliberal mechanisms in a very wide range of domains that are otherwise heterogeneous.
This observation concerning the formal character of neoliberalism’s central mechanism also poses an analytical challenge for researchers investigating actually existing neoliberalism. Namely, we may identify neoliberal mechanisms in a wide range of domains and political contexts without being able to say much, substantively, about how broader proposals for reform are organized, or about what their effects are likely to be. Just as, in Weber’s observation, the “formal rationality of money accounting does not reveal anything about the actual distribution of goods” (Weber 1978: 108) the fact that neoliberal reforms are characterized by formal mechanisms of calculative choice tells us nothing about the social norms or spatial forms with which they might be associated.

For this reason, an analysis of the formal dimensions of neoliberalism must be supplemented by a substantive analysis of the actual forms taken by neoliberalism. A substantive analysis, following Polanyi’s economic anthropology, would examine how neoliberal mechanisms are instituted in given systems. Thus, it would ask: How is calculative choice institutionalized? How does calculative choice relate to other instituted modes of economic interaction? What specific ends are pursued through the institutionalization of calculative choice in specific domains of governmental activity? Such questions might be addressed through three axes of a substantive analytics of neoliberalism: (1) the institutionalization of calculative choice; (2) the system of techno-economic regulation; and (3) the value-orientation of neoliberal reform in a given domain.

1) The institutionalization of calculative choice concerns the institutional arrangements through which formal calculation by specific actors in a given system is made possible. An orientation to calculative choice is not, as Polanyi (1977) insistently pointed out, an anthropological constant; nor, as Weber (1978) pointed out, is it a universal technical possibility. Rather, calculative choice is the
product of specific institutions. Investigation of the institutionalization of
calculative choice, thus, examines the mechanisms through which calculative
choice is made into a practical reality [3]. The institutionalization of calculative
choice, thus, corresponds to what Weber called the “substantive prerequisites”
(Weber, 1978: 107-108) of calculative choice or formal rationalization, analyzed
in his classic discussion of accounting in the capitalist firm.

In general, the institutionalization of calculative choice involves legal institutions
or administrative rules. Thus, Weber famously examined the role of property
institutions and corporation law in the constitution of calculative choice in the
economic sphere under capitalism. Another example, explored below, is the
constitution of local governments as nodes of calculative choice in an
interbudgetary system [4]. Consideration of the institutionalization of calculative
choice must include the limitations on calculative choice: the constraints on
freedom of choice, the limits on quantification. We see below that these
limitations on calculative choice, and the “costs” of such limitations, are a critical
consideration for architects of neoliberal reform.

2) Techno-economic regulation refers, following Menger, to mechanisms that
safeguard or ensure the production and reproduction of a given system (whether
ecological, biological, or mechanical) (Polayni, 1977: 21-24). Markets may be the
primary mechanism of techno-economic regulation, in which case, given a certain
mode of institutionalized calculative choice, we observe self-regulating techno-
economic systems.

In many cases of neoliberal reform, however, non-market mechanisms are
employed to guarantee the techno-economic functioning of a given system. One
familiar type of non-market techno-economic regulation involves rule making
functions by impartial arbiters of institutional norms. These range from rate
setting in central banks to standards-setting in neoliberal educational reforms
oriented to school choice. Such regulation may be particularly important in the
reform of complex technical systems. Thus, for example, electricity reform
involves institutionalizing various nodes of calculative choice (users, wholesale
buyers, electricity producers). But we have recently seen the importance of non-
market regulation in electricity that guarantees techno-economic functioning by,
for example, managing demand peaks, or by regulating flow across lines with
limited capacity.

3) Value-orientation concerns the ends toward which neoliberal reform is oriented. It
is often assumed that “competition and consumer demand have supplanted the
norms of public service” in neoliberal approaches to reform and government
(Larner, 2002: 13). However, if neoliberalism is a form of technical rationality –
that is, a rational organization of means to achieve certain ends – then one must
think about what these ends are, about the values upon which they are based, and
about the mechanisms through which such values are incorporated into technical
systems. Thus, to borrow a term from economic sociology, it is crucial to ask:
what are the mechanisms through which neoliberalism reconciles different regimes of worth, for example, market and social welfare regimes [5]? What are the concrete technical mechanisms through which reforms embed non-market values into systems whose predominant mode of valuation and distribution is that of calculative choice? How, to put the same point a different way, are market-type mechanisms oriented to the substantive ends of governing?

Two mechanisms for the embedding of non-market values in systems of calculative choice may be usefully distinguished: correlation and coding. Correlation is based on econometric-type analysis that suggests a relationship between specific policies or conditions and substantive outcomes: markets and growth or privatization and efficiency are familiar examples of such correlations (both of which have proven highly dubious). Coding uses substantive equivalents – referred to below as norms – to translate between orders of worth. Coding operations are typical of public sector reforms associated with rollout neoliberalism – including budgetary, social sector, and infrastructure reform. An example, discussed in what follows, is the coding of substantive ends of public sector policy into budgetary reform measures through the mechanism of a distribution coefficient.

To summarize the preceding discussion: First, following a tradition of Foucaultian work, the basic technical feature of neoliberalism can be defined as the dispersion of formal mechanisms of calculative choice in specific proposals for governing. Second, this definition tells us only a limited amount about the actual form through which neoliberal mechanisms are instituted. Therefore, third, analysis of the formal fact of calculative choice must be supplemented by a substantive analytics which suggests the form of actually existing neoliberalism in specific domains. Fourth, it is possible to identify concrete elements of such a substantive analytics that can be used to analyze reforms in a variety of domains.

These steps suggest two further questions that are addressed in the remainder of the paper. First, how can such a substantive analytics be mobilized in an empirical analysis? Second, how can such an empirical analysis contribute to an understanding of the spatial and structural questions that have interested critical geographers?
III. Soviet Spatial Regulation and Post-Soviet Transformation

The remainder of this article applies the substantive analytics of neoliberalism outlined above to reform in a specific case: public sector finance reform in post-Soviet Russia. It focuses in particular on interbudgetary reforms proposed in the late 1990s. What follows is not an analysis of the effects of reforms. Rather, the discussion remains on the level of reform proposals, and seeks to address the structural and spatial effects that are implicit in their technical makeup.

The Soviet Spatial System

Any discussion that addresses the spatial implications of neoliberal reform in Russia must begin from some understanding of the spatial system of the Soviet Union. From the onset of the Soviet period, the project of industrial planning was intertwined with spatial problems. Spatial planning was influenced by a variety of factors. For example, the demands of militarism – including the felt imperative to locate key elements of industry far from borders, and, in many cases, far from existing urban centers to maintain secrecy – played an enormous role. Also important, however, were the explicit orientations of city planning and socio-economic regulation. Soviet planners sought to promote the development of industrial cities of relatively limited size, to balance development across regional and national space, and to avoid the hypertrophic growth of the largest cities. This orientation was influenced by the European garden city movement whose ideals were adapted to a system of central planning through tight coordination between industrial and social planning by integrating urban settlements into mechanisms of national economic coordination (Bater, 1980; Starr, 1976).
At least three overlapping but distinct mechanisms of such coordination can be identified as crucial to the Soviet spatial system. The first mechanism was the system of industrial ministries, which coordinated input-output relationships both within and among industrial sectors. The second mechanism was the system for distributing energy inputs through national distribution grids to industrial and residential users, particularly gas, oil, and electricity. The third mechanism of coordination was the system of public sector budgets. Since we consider post-Soviet reform of the budgetary system below, it bears commenting in some detail on its structure during the Soviet period.

The Soviet budgetary system was organized through the Ministry of Finance, which formed a single “consolidated” budget that included all-Union, republican, regional, and local (municipal and rural) budgets [6]. The distribution of resources among these levels was driven, in principle, by a logic of gap filling, described in Figure 1. Gap filling was based on a bureaucratic definition of social “need” for any given locality. The definition of “need” was derived from social norms for service provision (in education, housing, health, and so on). Financing norms allowed the translation or coding of social needs into ruble equivalents. These ruble equivalents, in turn, were aggregated. The result was a definition of budgetary potrebnosti or “requirements” (R in figure 1) that defined the financial resources required to meet needs. In the final step of the process, higher-standing budgets acted to fill the deficit between locally collected tax revenue and bureaucratically defined “requirements” (R-L) for budgetary expenditure at any given level.
Sovietological discussions have provided abundant documentation of the shortcomings of urban and spatial planning. Difficulties were encountered in particular in balancing social and economic development in cities, and in limiting the growth of the largest cities (cf. Bater, 1980; Taubman, 1973). Nonetheless, key features of Soviet urban structure and spatial system can only be understood in reference to the explicit orientations of urban and social planning. First, the Soviet Union’s urban structure was characterized by an unusual preponderance of geographically dispersed small industrial cities, and limitations on the growth of the largest cities. Second, particularly in the last
decades of the Soviet period, a regime of socio-economic regulation consolidated that solidified a pattern of tight institutional coordination between social welfare regimes and industrial regulation. In this context, spatially remote, small industrial cities, served by a full range of urban and social goods and services, became an important form of urban-industrial settlement in the Soviet Union.

What is more, the mechanisms of coordination discussed above embedded these cities in a spatial system that in many ways exaggerated the spatial features associated with Fordist-Keynesian regulation. It was characterized by extreme emphasis on the national scale and by, increasingly, extreme inflexibility. After the astonishing spatial dynamism of the early Soviet decades, rates of population mobility declined to levels well below those found in Europe and the U.S. by the end of the Soviet period (Mitchnek and Plane, 1995). The timing of this shift is remarkable. Just as the Fordist-Keynesian mode of regulation was entering its crisis in Europe and the United States, the inflexible “spatio-temporal fix” of Soviet socialism was being consolidated.

“Rollback” Neoliberalism and Preservation in Post-Soviet Russia

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, reformers focused their energies on promoting a typical menu of “rollback” policies. These included rapid privatization of enterprises, the dismemberment (in the event, rather successful) of industrial ministries, achievement of monetary stabilization, imposition of fiscal balance, and the curtailment of soft credits to industrial enterprises.

Precisely to the extent that Soviet institutions of coordination were exceptionally inflexible, these rollback reforms implied a painful and dramatic spatial upheaval. Markets exposed an entire urban-industrial society to new pressures. Among these, of
course, were new spatial pressures. Urban-industrial settlements – particularly the ubiquitous small, dispersed industrial cities – were no longer reproduced by mechanisms of industrial coordination associated with the inflexible spatial system of Soviet socialism.

Leaving aside the extent to which rollback policies were implemented as reformers planned – a question that has spurred acrimonious debate – it can be stated without hesitation that they spurred massive transformation. Among its crucial components were precipitous industrial decline, though there is disagreement about how much, and a dramatic contraction in industrial employment. And yet, for most observers, the crucial feature of the period through the Ruble devaluation of 1998 (and, to a certain degree, in the period since) was not the enormity of adjustment processes but, rather, the limitations on such processes. The rate of enterprise bankruptcy during the period was low, and investment in new productive enterprise was limited. What is more, the spatial reorganization resulting from rollback policies was less than might have been expected. The period witnessed massive out-migration from the Far East and Far North of Russia, areas governed in the Soviet period by special administrative rules, in which settlement was generally supposed to be temporary. But it did not witness large-scale out-migration from small industrial cities, generally the hardest hit by industrial decline, to the larger cities of the Russian Federation. In other words, despite industrial decline, the spatial pattern of Soviet industry and urban settlement exhibited surprising resilience.

By the end of the 1990s a coherent explanation had emerged for these processes of “preservation.” A range of soft constraints meant that failing enterprises were able to continue operations, or at least avoid liquidation. The most discussed soft constraint was
on energy inputs, particularly electricity and gas, which was organized through regimes of non-payment, barter, and price controls (cf. Woodruff, 1999). Also significant were soft constraints on tax collection, in the form of toleration for non-payment and concessions. Less discussed, but equally important, were processes of preservation in the social sphere. The social sphere witnessed a major crisis in the 1990s as local governments, the primary providers of many social services, faced fiscal crisis. Levels of provisioning dropped precipitously. And yet, the broad orientation of local, regional, and central governments was not to cut levels of provisioning or the extent of services promised in line with fiscal resources. Rather, they sought to preserve the established baseline of local services, of income support (pensions in particular), and of public sector salaries through a range of mechanisms (Collier and Way, 1999).

In sum, if one crucial mechanism of Soviet spatial regulation—ministerial industrial coordination—collapsed precipitously with the end of Soviet socialism, two others—the budgetary system and the system of energy distribution—persisted. Together, these latter mechanisms of preservation did much to offset the dismemberment of industrial coordination.

The preservationist patterns of the 1990s drew the attention of reformers to the problem of reforming those mechanisms most crucial to processes of preservation, such as the public sector budget, public sector social welfare provisioning, and natural monopoly reform (gas and electricity, most centrally). Reforms in these areas had been discussed in the early 1990s, and were included in overall frameworks for structural adjustment (cf. World Bank 1994). But they were buried in the rush to implement the
core package of rollback policies. By the late 1990s, attention had returned to them, and programs reform began to be elaborated in a more serious and concerted fashion.

In the late 1990s and early 2000s some reformers spoke and wrote as though reform of these systems of coordination were merely a last, if particularly painful and difficult, step in the process of market-based adjustment (cf. Heath 2001). But a closer look at such reforms indicates that their relationship to market processes of “adjustment” is more ambiguous than technocratic discussions seem to imply. In areas such as communal service provisioning, public sector budgeting, social welfare, and utility regulation, reforms do seek to create mechanisms of calculative choice that will drive allocation and valuation in systems that had previously been organized through planning. But the same reforms also include non-market mechanisms, and new modalities of government that bear features of what Peck and Tickell call “rollout” reform. As we see, the social norms and spatial implications of rollout reforms turn out to be highly ambiguous.

IV. Budgetary Reform

The final sections of this article examine rollout reform in one domain, the public sector budget. Budgetary reforms, as we will see, do disperse mechanisms of calculative choice through the system of public sector finance. But they also serve to rearticulate various Soviet mechanisms of spatial regulation and Soviet social norms in a manner that may contribute to preservationist patterns. Analysis of these reforms suggests that processes of “preservation” are not only the result of path dependencies and resistance to
neoliberalism. They are also the result of the explicit aims of neoliberal reforms themselves.

Fiscal Federalism

Before proceeding to budgetary reforms in Russia, a few comments should be made on the development of fiscal reform as a domain of concern for neoliberalism. Public sector budgetary reform was one *locus classicus* of the development of a neoliberal approach to public policy. In the United States, proposals for neoliberal budgetary reform consolidated around the problem of what is referred to in technical discussions as *fiscal federalism*, which concerns fiscal relations among organs of territorial-administrative authority – local, regional, and central governments [7].

The backdrop of fiscal federal discussions when they emerged after World War II was the massive expansion and centralization of public expenditures, particularly social expenditures, from the 1930s to the 1950s. This expansion led, as one important theorist put it, to “the diversion of greater and greater shares of the total of economic resources through the fiscal mechanism” (Buchanan, 1972: 348). In other words, an increasing portion of national product was *not* being allocated by markets, but by decision-makers in the public sector.

One important implication of this shift, according to fiscal federal theorists, was that the public sector budget increasingly affected (in a potentially adverse fashion, reformers thought) the efficiency of resource allocation in society generally. By implication, the budget also became a major mechanism in shaping the geography of factor allocation. Fiscal federal theorists also raised concerns related to the internal
workings of the budgetary system. Specifically, they addressed the incentives of actors within it – particularly those responsible for budgetary decision-making – to make the delivery of services as efficient as possible.

Viewing fiscal federal theory from a Foucaultian perspective, we might say that its response to the massive growth of state expenditures was to examine the public sector fiscal system through the lens of a critique that employed the market as a regulative ideal. This critique framed a series of questions that shaped reform proposals: To what extent could the public sector budget be organized as a system driven by the calculative choices of free actors? How could public sector expenditures be prevented from distorting the allocative mechanisms of markets, including spatial mechanisms? How could the system of public administration and territorial administration be managed in an efficient manner through reform of the fiscal mechanism?

**Budgetary Reform in Russia**

Budgetary reform was initially proposed in Russia at the very beginning of the post-Soviet period, and was included as a major focus of the fiscal adjustment strategy articulated by the World Bank in 1994 (World Bank, 1994). Various changes were made in the budgetary system in the 1990s (cf. Bird, 1996). These included some clarifications of fiscal federal relationships, among them a provision in the 1993 Constitution (reaffirmed in subsequent legislation) that gave sub-national governments, both regional and local, control over budgetary policy. But a program for reform of the interbudgetary system—in other words, the system for the distribution of taxation and spending
decisions, and for the distribution of funds among budgetary levels—was not formulated until the later part of the 1990s.

The discussion that follows examines a technical document on fiscal federal reform in this period. It relates specifically to regional interbudgetary relationships, that is, relationships among regional governments and local governments, both cities and rural districts. The document, “Methodological Recommendations for the Regulation of Interbudgetary Relationships in Subjects of the Russian Federation,” was prepared in the context of a Georgia State University (U.S.) project on tax reform (Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation, 1999). The Georgia State project was run by foreign technical experts who circulate among various international development organizations – particularly the World Bank and USAID, which funded the project – propagating a certain vision of neoliberal budgetary reform. Notably, however, “Methodological Recommendations” itself was written by a Russian team, based on detailed investigations of the existing interbudgetary process in Russian regions. It is a product, in this sense, of the kind of institutional and technocratic space in which the formal proposals of neoliberal reform are given substantive content in specific contexts. Consequently, it is a good document for the study of actually existing neoliberalism.

The proposals formulated in “Methodological Recommendations” were adopted by the Russian Ministry of Finance in 1999. Their status was only “recommendatory,” since the Federal Ministry has no control—at least no formal control—over regional budgetary policy. Implementation, therefore, has been spotty; and the Report does not offer a description of the system as it works today. But the proposals outlined by the Georgia State project are of interest for two reasons beyond the fact that they provide a
clear picture of the internal logic of reforms. The first reason is that their specific mechanisms are typical of neoliberal budgetary reforms more generally. The second is that many of the key mechanisms proposed in the Georgia State proposal had been previously adopted by the Federal Ministry of Finance for federal-regional interbudgetary relations. Consequently, they suggest a pattern of reform, and a spatial mechanism, that is being pursued at both the national and sub-national level.

The discussion that follows presents a substantive analysis of the Georgia State report by tracing its argument through three steps. First, it examines the report’s critique of the existing system of budgetary management as of the late 1990s. Second, it examines the report’s proposals for the institutionalization of calculative choice as a crucial mechanism in the budgetary system. Third, it examines the value orientation established in the proposed interbudgetary mechanism.

**Critique**

“Methodological Recommendations” begins with a critical assessment of the Russian budgetary system as it existed in the late 1990s. After ruble stabilization in 1994, the report notes, finances of most local governments in Russia collapsed. Public sector payments (wages and benefits) and public sector services (education, health, utility provision) were thrown into crisis.

And yet, the authors of the Report found that local governments did not respond by adjusting the range of goods and services they delivered. Rather, they used a variety of mechanisms to preserve services with less revenue (Collier and Way 1999). Regional budgetary offices, for their part, partially supported these “preservationist” policies. They
sought, as the Report noted, to “make up, from the regional budget, the difference between tax and non-tax revenues of the local budget in a given year and its ‘requirements’” (Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation, 1999: 10). In other words, they pursued the old Soviet practice of gap filling discussed above.

“Methodological Recommendations” noted that these “preservationist” efforts at gap filling introduced a range of distortions and inefficiencies. Although the report does not describe its approach in this way, we can say that its method is to identify barriers to market-type mechanisms of allocation and structures of incentive in the existing system, and to analyze the distortions and inefficiencies these introduce. Thus, for example, the Report observes that, given the gap-filling strategy of regional governments, local governments lack a clear incentive to increase tax collections (since increased local collections were likely to simply decrease the level of transfers), and therefore are less inclined to pressure local enterprises to pay taxes in full. Given the prospect, if not always the reality, of continued subsidization of local services even when local finances were inadequate, local governments do not adjust expenditure commitments in line with fiscal capacities. Lacking accountability for expenditure decisions, local governments have little incentive to improve service delivery.

The Report also argues that gap-filling introduces broader “distortions” that relate directly to the spatial functions of the Soviet budgetary system. Precisely because gap-filling seeks to perpetuate old Soviet institutions of redistribution it also tends to reproduce the Soviet spatial system. As such, it emerges as one factor that impedes market-based processes of spatial reallocation, or adjustment, of productive factors.
**Institutionalization of calculative choice**

The first step in reforming this system proposed in “Methodological Recommendations” is to reengineer the budgetary system to work through the calculative choices of formally free actors rather than by centralized bureaucratic decisions. To do so, the proposals aim to create calculative choice as an institutional reality. In a budgetary system, the locus of such calculative choice is first of all the organs of territorial administration – local governments – that control budgets.

“Methodological Recommendations” lays out a number of steps in this institutionalization of calculative choice. First, in place of the existing practice of shifting the distribution of tax revenues among different budgetary levels in response to budgetary needs, regional governments are to permanently assign a certain portion of taxes to the local level. Executives and legislatures will know, therefore, exactly what revenues “belong” to them, thus clarifying incentives for taxation and spending decisions. Second, in contrast to the Soviet system, in which most expenditures were obligatory, local governments will be given the legal right (equally a burden in times of fiscal shortage) to make expenditure decisions. Thus, rather than having local expenditures defined by centrally dictated social norms, local governments can, within the scope of assigned expenditure responsibilities, adjust expenditure priorities. In short, local governments will have clearly defined resources, clearly defined responsibilities, and clearly defined domains of competency within which they are free to calculatively choose a course of action.
These steps serve to constitute local budgets as loci of calculative choice. As such, they extend a market-type mechanism to an institutional context that is far from being a market. The steps involved in doing so can be identified across a broad range of neoliberal reforms: clarify assets and liabilities, clearly assign rights and responsibilities, and establish freedoms and constraints in order to create the institutional possibility of calculative choice.

**Value orientation**

The second dimension of the proposals laid out in “Methodological Recommendations” concerns the substantive values that are to be realized through the budgetary system. The report proposes as a basic value-orientation for the management of the inter-budgetary system that “every inhabitant of [any given] region has roughly equal requirements for budgetary expenditures and has the right to make a claim on an equal level of services from local government” (Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation, 1999:10). This value orientation suggests that the budgetary mechanism should function in a highly redistributive manner.

The difficulty, of course, is that a guarantee of equal budgetary expenditures would reproduce precisely those characteristics of the Soviet system (and of post-Soviet gap-filling practices) that “Methodological Recommendations” has critiqued. The solution proposed is a redistribution fund from which resources are allocated among municipalities on the basis of a formula, described in figure 2. This redistribution fund (D in Figure 2) is constituted as a portion of the total revenues of the regional budget [8]. Resources that accrue to the fund are divided among local governments on the basis of
distribution coefficients \( C_{\text{city}x} \) that define the percentage of the fund that will be allocated to any given municipality or rural district \( (C_{\text{city}x} \times D) \).

**Figure 2: Post-Soviet Proposals for Inter-budgetary Reform**

Distribution coefficients for a given city \( C_{\text{city}x} \) are based on norms for social provisioning in a range of domains, such as health, education, and communal services, based on key features of the locality.

\[
C_{\text{city}1} = f(C_{\text{health}1}, C_{\text{education}1}, C_{\text{housing}1})
\]

\[
C_{\text{health}1} = f(\text{population}_{\text{city}1})
\]

\[
C_{\text{education}1} = f(\text{school age children}_{\text{city}1})
\]

\[
C_{\text{housing}1} = f(\text{climate}_{\text{city}1}, \text{population}_{\text{city}1})
\]

Spatial Implications depend on the size of the redistribution fund \( D \). A large redistribution fund (large % of consolidated regional budget) means the budgetary system is highly redistributive and tends to reproduce existing spatial pattern. Small redistribution fund means greater dispersion in local resources across cities in a region.
The coefficient for each municipality, in turn, is established on the basis of a specific technical understanding of “need,” defined by a series of sub-coefficients. These sub-coefficients describe the percentage of regional “need” for a given social service – education, utilities, health care, and so on – accounted for by any given locality. For example, the sub-coefficient for education is based on the percentage of school-age children in a region accounted for by a given municipality or rural district. Thus, if 12% of the school-age children in a region live in a certain city, then 12% of a specific portion of the redistribution fund—whose size depends on how education is weighted—would be allocated to that municipality. Similar sub-coefficients define localities’ need for health care, communal services including heat and water, transportation services, and so on.

In the language proposed above, the distribution formula works through a system of coding that works through a number of steps: first, the translation of social, demographic, climatic, and geographic features of a municipality into a sub-coefficient that defines need in a given domain; second, the translation of groups of sub-coefficients into municipal coefficients that defines the relative “need” level of that municipality relative to overall “need” for all municipalities in a given region; third, the translation of these municipal coefficients into an actual distribution of resources. In short, the process of coding translates normatively defined needs into fiscal flows.

A technical analysis of this type draws our attention to a remarkable fact. Namely, that the social norms that comprise the distribution formulae and serve to define need are nearly identical to those that drove budgetary distributions in the Soviet period [9]. The areas of social provisioning that define social need differ little from those used under socialism. And the assumptions about the constitution of “need” – based on the number
of school age children, the local climate and thus the need for heating fuels, the transport costs of inputs that must be procured by the local government – differ little from those that drove budgeting during the Soviet period. In other words, to the extent that resources are channeled through the redistribution fund, they are driven by the social norms of Soviet socialism.

Neoliberalism and spatial transformation

What would a budgetary system organized along the lines just described imply for processes of spatial and structural transformation? And how to these neoliberal proposals relate to Soviet mechanisms of spatial regulation?

As we have seen, in the Soviet period the budgetary system was one among a number of regulatory and allocative systems that fixed enterprises, local governments, human populations, and social service regimes in given spatial and institutional relationships. The reproduction of these relationships was inscribed in the very workings of the budgetary system itself, which translated normed needs directly into fiscal flows.

The institutionalization of calculative choice outlined in the Georgia State Report is one dimension of a very different vision, in which these formerly fixed elements are placed in motion. Enterprises may continue to operate, close, or move, depending in part on their economic viability in market conditions, in part on the tax regime implemented by a given local government. Residents may choose to stay or go, depending on their satisfaction with local services (education, health, and public infrastructure services) and on the availability of local employment. Local governments, finally, may adjust levels of service delivery or taxation to promote local development, to provide for basic needs, or
simply to avoid being thrown out of office. Is it not the case that “marketization” is precisely the proper description for such a vision? Is it not the case that cities and regions are simply left to their own “enterprising” efforts at survival? And is this not, precisely, the dramatic undermining of Fordist space-making institutions?

The answer is complicated by the value-orientation of these reforms, institutionalized through the redistribution mechanisms discussed above. Just as the redistribution mechanism has implications for the social norms of these reforms it also has implications for spatial transformation. As a space-making mechanism, the redistribution fund mirrors the gap-filling mechanism of Soviet budgeting. To the extent that resources are channeled through the redistribution fund, they will tend to re-inscribe the existing spatial pattern of settlement—or at least the existing spatial distribution of financing for social service provisioning—across cities in a region.

But in precisely this question—the extent to which resources are in fact channeled through the redistribution fund—lies the critical difference between Soviet budgeting and neoliberal reform proposals. The distribution coefficient does not define an actual commitment of finances. It is only a multiplier that determines the portion of the redistribution fund to be transferred to a given city or rural settlement in a given region. The reforms’ value orientation toward offering citizens an equal “right to make a claim on an equal level of services from local government” (Ministry of Finance, Russian Federation, 1999:10) guarantees neither an adequate nor an equal level of service provision. The equalizing function of the redistribution fund depends crucially on the size of the distribution fund itself.
“Methodological Recommendations” notes various policy approaches that regional governments might pursue in determining the portion of regional resources to be channeled through the fund. At one extreme, a vast majority of regional resources may be dedicated to the fund. In this case, *per capita* expenditures—or, more precisely, expenditures relative to normatively defined need *per capita*—would be highly equalized across municipalities. The budgetary mechanism would promote relatively redistributive outcomes, and, thus, tend to support existing patterns of settlement. On the other extreme, a relatively small portion of regional resources might be placed in the fund. In this case the budgetary mechanism would function in a relatively less redistributive manner. Resources available to individual localities would depend to a greater degree on their ability to raise revenue locally. Expenditures relative to normatively defined need would vary substantially across localities.

Each variant, notes the report, has benefits and disadvantages. Increasing the percentage of regional resources allocated to the redistribution fund would promote the value of equal social provisioning, thus meeting one important goal of the reforms: equal access to provisioning for all citizens. However, equalization entails “costs.” It dilutes the incentives of local governments to increase revenue (since any incremental increase in tax collection will be distributed, according to the coefficients, across all municipalities). More broadly, distributing a relatively high proportion of regional resources through the fund distorts market mechanisms of spatial allocation to the extent that resources will follow bureaucratic definitions of need rather than be focused on the richest cities where most taxes are collected.
A relatively less equalizing variant—one in which the distribution fund is composed by a relatively small portion of the consolidated regional budget—would increase the incentives of local governments to raise taxes, to make service delivery more efficient, and to adjust levels of service provision in line with the local revenue base. It would also encourage a broader process of spatial “adjustment.” Poor municipalities would have to cut services and public sector employment as effective subsidies declined; presumably, in the medium term, people would leave, and the spatial dispersion effects expected of marketizing reform would take greater hold.

It is of central interest that “Methodological Recommendations” does not recommend one variant over the other. Such decisions, the report notes, are for politicians, not for technocratic experts. (If only all “neoliberals” were such faithful Weberians!) The decision, therefore, is to be made on the basis of the specific needs of regions and the expenditure priorities of regional governments.

The crucial implication that follows is this: the formal fact that budgetary reforms employ “neoliberal” mechanisms—the fact that they seek to govern not directly but through the calculative choices of formally free actors—tells us relatively little about their spatial and structural implications. In the subtle technical question concerning the size of the redistribution fund lies a world of difference in the relationship of neoliberal techniques to existing space-making mechanisms, and, thus, to processes of spatial transformation. All that can be said is that, in this case, neoliberalism provides a technical frame for maneuvering, in a manner that is ultimately ambiguous, between two systems of valuation, two mechanisms of distribution, and, consequently, two space-forming mechanisms. On one extreme, budgetary reforms would tend to promote a truly
marketizing pattern of transformation. On the other extreme, they would tend to promote a highly “preservationist” pattern. Between these antipodes, however, the reforms would serve, in a more subtle fashion, to reinscribe the social norms and spatial forms of Soviet socialism through neoliberal mechanisms of calculative choice.

V. Conclusion: Situating a Technical Analysis

It may well be objected that the technical emphasis of the preceding analysis draws attention away from some of the most important questions that must be addressed in critical discussions of neoliberalism. First, it brackets for analytical purposes a central question in the critical geographic literature, namely, the broader political or hegemonic projects of which neoliberal reforms are a part. Second, it does not immediately address questions of implementation. Whatever the intentions of reformers, what actually happens when reforms are put into practice may depend on a range of factors that are not laid out in plans.

These are both important arguments. They raise key empirical and analytical questions, including whether the label “neoliberalism” today designates too many different things to be conceptually useful. Whether or not that is true, the central premise of the present argument remains, namely, that a great deal of analytic leverage can be gained by carefully distinguishing, at least on a conceptual level, neoliberal technical mechanisms that have been discussed in the preceding analysis from two other problems into which they are often collapsed: first, structural transformations associated marketization and liberalization; second, the political orientations and goals of key actors involved in promoting neoliberal reforms.
The importance of this distinction lies simply in the fact that, whether or not these three registers—technical, structural, and political—were ever in stable alignment, they are not so today. Post-Soviet Russia provides one clear example. There, President Vladimir Putin is pursuing many reforms that have “neoliberal” features. But Putin is no great marketizer or liberalizer by any stretch of the imagination, and it strains meaningful analysis to see his activity as part of a broader hegemonic project. Many parallel examples from various regions of the world could be cited. To dismiss these emergent realignments as simple “contortions” of political leaders who remain committed to a neoliberal hegemonic project—as Peck and Tickell have written of the Third Way policies of Clinton and Blair—takes too much for granted. It also seems to obviate both empirical and critical analysis just where it is needed most.

Notes

1. Here, for matters of convenience, and due to constant slippage in the scholarly discussion under consideration, “liberalism” and “neoliberalism” are used interchangeably. The clarification of the distinction between liberalism and neoliberalism is one of the major contributions of the Foucaultian literature discussed later in the article (cf. Burchell 1996; Rose 1996).

2. Weber, of course, referred to the ideal type as an analytical tool for social scientists, but “ideal regulating concepts” function equally in technocratic discussions. (cf. Cahnman, 1993).

3. The creation of calculative choice has been examined in the governmentality literature, though not, as Larner (2000) suggests, on a level of technical detail.

4. The mode of institutionalization of calculative choice may also involve material structures. For example, the possibility of calculative choice in integrated infrastructural systems requires that users can choose levels of use and that levels of use are measured—features that are not by any means universal in such systems, and that, in many cases, pose difficult technical problems (cf. Collier 2004).

5. For example, Girard and Stark have examined the interactions between “multiple evaluative frameworks” in a range of organizational contexts. Building on this work, neoliberalism becomes a commensuration technology, one that seeks to bring diverse orders of worth into coherent frameworks for calculative choice. (cf. Giard and Stark, 2005)
6. For excellent discussions of Soviet budgeting see Bahry, 1987 and Lewis, 1976.
7. For a helpful review of the development of fiscal federal discussions, see Oates, 1999.
8. To be precise, the redistribution fund is a proportion of what is referred to as the “consolidated” regional budget – the sum of revenues from taxes assigned to local and regional budgets in a given region – minus locally instituted taxes.

References


